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Professor Emerita of Aristotle University of Thessaloniki 
Assisted Reproduction by Donor – Legal and Bioethical Issues 
 
Besides changing the fate of people facing infertility issues, the spectacular 
scientific achievements in the field of assisted reproduction over the last forty years 
have also resulted in a modification of the relation of human reproduction to the Law. 
In the past, this relation used to be established once a child was born and mostly 
referred to the establishment of kinship. Today, however, the need for legal provisions 
to be put in place, governing the particular applications of artificial fertilisation 
practically shifts this relation between procreation and the Law backwards, that is to 
say at the time before a child is born, while at the same time makes this relation more 
complex and much more interesting. 
As far as the particular issue of assisted reproduction by use of third-party 
donated reproductive material is concerned, otherwise referred to as the “heterologous 
artificial fertilisation”, it was in 1983 that Greek legislators referred to the matter for 
the first time and that was in a provision in the Greek Civil Code, depriving the 
spouse of a mother having originally consented to his wife being subjected to an 
heterologous artificial fertilisation procedure, of the right to ex post contest the 
paternity of the offspring (cf. former Article 1471.2 item 2 of the Greek Civil Code). 
Therefore, by the time the Greek legislators behind the basic Greek lex specialis in the 
matter of medically assisted reproduction (i.e. Law 3089/2002, the best part of which 
was later integrally transposed into the Greek Civil Code) were eventually asked to 
regulate the various legal issues relevant to such practice in a more specific way, the 
legal world had already become more familiar with the topic. Otherwise said, the 
overall acceptability of heterologous reproduction was not being challenged, but there 
had nevertheless remained in suspense several particular aspects needing to be 
tackled, issues already debated upon and to a certain extent still under debate, today. I 
will allow myself to elaborate upon certain of such issues in my presentation. 




Let me start by explaining which parties may, under the Greek legislation, 
become third-party donors. Such third-party donors may primarily be persons having 
themselves manifested an interest to procreate and which, prior to doing so, had also 
expressly made their consent known as to their “spare” reproductive material – that is 
to say, the reproductive material eventually to remain unutilized after the offspring 
they had aspired at having was born – becoming available “without financial 
exchange and prioritarily to such other persons as the physician or the Medical Center 
may designate”. This is precisely what is stipulated under Article 1459.1(a) of the 
Greek Civil Code, where the following important issues are solved: (1) that the 
reproductive material (sperm, eggs, fertilised eggs) may, in globo, be legally 
considered to be a “thing”, that is to say “a legal object”, therefore disposable by its 
donors ; (2) that the reproductive material shall not be the object of a commercial 
transaction whatsoever and (3) that the principle of the anonymity of donors is 
embedded, as suggested by the fact that no contact shall exist between donors and 
recipients of the reproductive material. 
Besides such first category of donors, however, namely those having 
themselves been subjected to artificial reproduction procedures and consenting to the 
disposal of their “spare” reproductive material, there is a second category, namely that 
of the ordinary, third-party donors, men and women rendering themselves at the 
medical centers or reproductive material banks to deposit their sperm and / or eggs, 
just as an ordinary blood donor deposits one’s blood. 
A fundamental difference between reproductive material donors of the first 
and those of the second category lies in the fact that the former are actually the sole 
donors from which we may also obtain fertilised eggs whereas ordinary donors only 
donate sperm and/or simple eggs1. What is definitely interesting both as a fact and as 
a controversial issue is the capacity of a donor as a “third party” vis-à-vis the female 
undergoing an assisted reproduction procedure. More specifically, as far as such 
woman is concerned, neither her spouse having donated his sperm nor her partner in 
the event of a cohabitation contract nor even the woman’s regular partner without a 
cohabitation contract (who lives with her in a free union) donating his sperm 
                                                 
1 Article 8.3. of Law 3305/2005; also, indicatively, see “Family Law” (Οικογενειακό Δίκαιο) ΙΙ5 by 
 Prof. Kounougeri – Manoledaki, II5 (2012) 72. 




subsequent to a notarized consent as to the assisted reproduction, may be considered 
as “third parties”. Could the same be suggested, however, when the sperm of a 
(without a cohabitation contract) regular partner is used without a notarized consent 
on his part? 
Such circumstance became to be a real issue in Greece, when an unwed female 
living permanently with a man albeit not under a cohabitation contract, subjected 
herself to an assisted reproduction procedure using his sperm without having 
previously obtained his consent thereto. Such absence of a notarized consent on the 
part of the male partner resulted in the inapplicability of Article 1475.3 of the Greek 
Civil Code, according to which “[…] a notarized consent by the male as to the [use of 
his sperm for] assisted reproduction purposes  [….] shall be construed as a voluntary 
acknowledgement of paternity”, this having been the reason why the mother took 
recourse against her male partner before the courts, by way of a lawsuit whereby she 
requested that paternity over the child be judicially acknowledged. But then, the issue 
occurred as to whether a judicial acknowledgement of the paternity should be 
excluded in the light of Article 1479.2 of the Greek Civil Code, according to which: 
“in the event of assisted reproduction being performed with the use of a third-party 
donor reproductive material, the judicial acknowledgment of the paternity is 
excluded, even in the case of the [donor’s] identity being already or becoming 
posteriorily known”. But, could the particular male, with whom the woman in 
question lived, be considered a “third-party donor”? The case matured itself enough to 
end up before the Greek Supreme Court (Areios Pagos)2, which held that the man 
with whom the woman used to live was not, as far as she was concerned, a third-
party donor, hence the possibility of judicial acknowledgement of the paternity in that 
particular case. 
I am of the opinion that legally linking to the biological father by way of a 
judicial acknowledgement of paternity in that particular case does not conform with 
the terms of Law 3089/20023. It is in fact generally known as well as deduced from 
the terms of Article 1459.1 of the Greek Civil Code already commented above and 
                                                 
2 See Decision 898/2014 by the Greek Supreme Court, published in the “ΕλλΔνη” (Hellenic Justice) 
Law Review, 55 (2014) 736 (as well as relevant remarks of Kounougeri – Manoledaki in op. cit.). 
3 Ap. Georgiades, “Family Law” (Οικογενειακό Δίκαιο) (2014) 517 et seq.; Kounougeri - Manoledaki, 
Remarks on Decision 898/2014 by the Greek Supreme Court, in ΕλλΔνη (Hellenic Justice) Law 
Review, 55 (2014) 737 et seq. 




even more specifically from those of Article 1479.24 that this law actually 
consolidates the principle of “socio-emotional kinship”, under which, given the 
developments in biotechnology and most particularly in the light of participation, in 
the reproduction procedure, of third parties, legal kinship no longer needs to rely on 
the biological truth: rather, it is the “intention” of the parties that is privileged as a 
primal criterion for such kinship to be established. In the light of such considerations, 
it is of primordial importance for the child to legally link to those who actually 
wanted him (his “social” parents) and not necessarily to those from whom the child 
actually descends (his “genetic” parents). As a matter of fact, this is precisely the 
assumption also expressed in other, quite fundamental provisions of the Greek 
legislation in the matter of assisted reproduction, as is for instance the new version of 
Article 1471.2 item 2 of the Greek Civil Code, providing for a general prohibition to 
contest the paternity of a child born through an heterologous artificial fertilisation if 
the spouse of the mother has previously consented thereto; the same goes with respect 
to all other provisions consolidating the anonymity of the donor ( to be elaborated in 
due course hereunder). 
Interestingly, the element of intention, so critical for the establishment of 
kinship, may manifest itself either positively or negatively. This is exactly what 
Article 1479.2 of the Greek Civil Code enshrines, prohibiting as it is a judicial 
acknowledgement of the paternity of a third-party donor – the latter evidently 
operating merely as a “human cell provider”5 and otherwise declining to legally bond 
with his biological offspring. Such negative manifestation is understood through the 
fact that the donor – biological father (irrespective of whether he lives in a free union 
the mother – as is the case herein discussed - or not) had not provided a notarized 
consent to the artificial reproduction, which would have allowed the child to be 
automatically acknowledged by the donor by virtue of Article 1475.2 of the Greek 
                                                 
4 See indicatively in Kounougeri – Manoledaki “Assisted Reproduction and Family Law” (Τεχνητή 
γονιμοποίηση και Οικογενειακό Δίκαιο2) (2005) 136 et seq.; also, in “Family Law” (Οικογενειακό 
Δίκαιο), op.cit by the same author ΙΙ5 213; Koumoutzis, Establishment of kinship through the father 
after Law 3089/2002 (Η ίδρυση της συγγένειας με τον πατέρα μετά τον ν. 3089/2002), ΧρΙΓ Γ/2003. 
515. 
5 See relevant comments in Kotzabassi, “The anonymity of a sperm donor in artificial insemination as 
a legal and ethical issue” (Η ανωνυμία του δότη σπέρματος στην τεχνητή γονιμοποίηση ως νομικό και 
ηθικό ζήτημα) in «Απόψεις και ιδέες» (Views and Ideas) (2006) 197 et seq. 




Civil Code, nor did he want to acknowledge it voluntarily, if anything at least upon 
the child’s birth, hence the need for the issue of judicial acknowledgment to be raised. 
Therefore, the fact that the fundamental difference between artificial and 
natural reproduction lies in that there are different elements prevailing in each of such 
two procedures (i.e. in the former procedure, what overwhelmingly prevails is the 
desire to procreate irrespective of the child’s genetic origin whereas in the latter, what 
is definitely privileged are the elements of origin and biological truth) actually 
justifies the prohibition of judicial acknowledgement of paternity in the former 
instance just as it explains the acceptance of such acknowledgement, in the latter6. 
Yet another interesting issue relevant to third-party donors is the one 
associated to the element of consent – although this time consent is perceived 
differently: rather than consent to the assisted reproduction, this time what interests is 
the consent to the disposal of the reproductive material. When it comes to this 
particular element, Article 8.2. of Law 3305/2005 (i.e. the second Greek Law 
governing medically assisted reproduction) already in its very first item stipulates the 
obvious7, namely that “the disposal of gametes and fertilised eggs […] is effected by 
consent of the donors”. The following item, however, in its original formulation, read 
as follows: “in the event of the donors being married or living together in a free union, 
there also has to be obtained a written consent of the spouse or the partner”. 
By way of such second item, the legislator eventually attempted to settle the 
issue raised at the time prior to adoption of Law 3305/2005, namely whether the 
deposit by a married man of his reproductive material, in a sperm bank or in a medical 
center, as a donor, is something strictly pertaining the sphere of such man’s private 
                                                 
6 Were one to be given to wonder how such a difference could ever be justified in the light of the 
primacy of the child’s true interest – that is, why could the child that is born through artificial 
reproduction not also benefit from the possibility to acquire a legal father through a judicial 
acknowledgement of his paternity – the answer to be given could go as follows: within an artificial 
reproduction context, the child’s true interest in having his paternity judicially acknowledged by the 
sperm donor is much more limited, since such medical procedures include a preliminary stage in which 
the donor has the opportunity to cool-mindedly and ex ante make clear his refusal to assume legal 
paternity and all those obligations that go with it (see “Family Law” op.cit, ΙΙ5 213 by Kounougeri – 
Manoledaki) hence the assumption of such person’s inadequacy to be a parent (besides it being abusive 
to allow for a declaratory action against such person, under the circumstances). 
7 See in “Issues relevant to the disposal of reproductive material” by Prof. Fountedaki in “Publications 
on Medical Law and Bioethical Issues “15 (Medically Assisted Human Reproduction: 10 years of 
experience from the implementation of Law 3089/2002) (Δημοσιεύματα Ιατρικού Δικαίου και 
Βιοηθικής 15 – presented as of a conference hosted in honor of Professor E. Kounougeri – Manoledaki, 
2013 (167). 




interests, - hence the unnecessity of the spouse’s or partner’s8 agreement or consent – 
or if the particular nature of reproductive material - consisting in its potential to 
contribute, together with the reproductive material of the spouse or partner, to the 
procreation of a common descendant - actually turns this into a marital life issue, 
pertaining the scope of competence of both spouses who are thus to decide upon it 
jointly, in the sense of Article 1387 of the Greek Civil Code. 
At the time prior to the adoption of Law 3305/2005 this particular issue used 
to be raised with respect to the reproductive material as a whole. Subsequent to the 
entry into effect of Article 8.3. of Law 3305/2005, according to which the disposal of 
fertilised eggs shall strictly be limited to the exceeding number of fertilised eggs and 
given that one way or another, such eggs shall at all times be disposed of upon joint 
agreement of the couple, in accordance with the terms of the fore mentioned Article 
1459.1(a), the question as to whether the consent of the spouse or the partner is 
required could only be raised with respect to the regular sperm or simple eggs 
deposited by ordinary, third-party donors. As far as this latter issue is concerned, the 
matter has been tackled by way of Article 8.2 item (2)9, in the light of which the trend 
is to consider this as a marital life issue. This assumption, however, has also come to 
change, in the light of Article 15.1. of Law 4272/2014 whereby Article 8.2. item (2) 
was amended in such a way as to stipulate that “in the event of disposal of fertilised 
eggs, when donors are married women or women living in free union, there also needs 
to be supplied a written consent by the spouse or the partner”. E contrario, such 
provision renders it possible for gametes – i.e. sperm and eggs – to be freely disposed 
of, unconditional as to a requirement for consent by the spouse. Of course, no doubt 
remains as to the fact that the formulation of Article 15.1. and consequently of Article 
8.2. item (2) is erroneous, since the provision relevant to the need for consent by the 
spouse or partner as a condition for the disposal of fertilised eggs has already been 
                                                 
8 See in “Human Reproduction and Civil Medical Liability” (Ανθρώπινη αναπαραγωγή και αστική 
ιατρική ευθύνη) (2007) 270 et seq. by Prof. Fountedaki. Also by the same author: “Issues relevant to 
the disposal of reproductive material” op.cit, 167. Also, in “In-vitro fertilization through third-party 
reproductive material: Bioethical and Civil Law Issues” (Eξωσωματική γονιμοποίηση με ξένο 
γεννητικό υλικό:Ζητήματα βιοηθικής και αστικού δικαίου), in “Studies in Family Law and 
Biomedicine Law”, 1980 – 2010 (2010) 445, footnote 63 by Prof. Kounougeri-Manoledaki. 
9 In favor of the assumption that Article 8.2 item (2) is only applicable in the case of ordinary third-
party donors, see Article “The new Law 3305/2005 on “implementation of medically assisted 
reproduction”: Issues raised with respect to the correlation of provisions amongst themselves as well as 
with respect to the provisions of Law 3089/2002” by Kounougeri – Manoledaki, in the Armenopoulos 
Law Review, 59 (2006) 675. 




established under Article 1459.1(a)10. Whatever the arguments around it, the crux of 
the matter remains the same: the consent of the spouse or partner is no longer required 
for the disposal of simple sperm or eggs, hence the prevalence of the theory in favor 
of this being an issue ascribing the private sphere of the donor. 
There are three different rationales whereby such new legislative approach 
may be justified. The first of such rationales is relevant to the typical issue of property 
rights on the reproductive material: assuming that the reproductive material may be 
legally characterized as a “thing”11, no one but the donor may claim property rights 
upon the sperm or the eggs, which means that only the donor is entitled to 
unrestrictedly dispose of such material. Yet, even on the basis of the alternative nature 
attributed to the reproductive material, namely that of an element of the donor’s 
personality (a basis we may also accept12), it may be sustained that it makes sense for 
the donor to be entitled to make his / her own decision with respect to elements 
exclusively ascribing his / her own personality. Still, there is a third rationale, namely 
that of the expediency, suggesting that facilitating the disposal of the reproductive 
material fosters a reduction of risks of shortage thereof as well as of the need to seek 
supplies of reproductive material from sources outside the country. Perhaps the 
legislator behind Law 4272/2004 had also this third rationale in mind13. 
                                                 
10 According to said provisions, donors make their reproductive material available to third parties upon 
a written statement to be made in accordance to the terms of this Article and without any need for 
further consent in the sense of Article 8.2. item (2) (see in “Issues”, op. cit. by Prof. Fountedaki). 
11 Indicatively, see: “Sperm, Ovum and Fertilsed Ovum Outside the Human Body: Their Legal Nature 
and Treatment in Modern Greek Civil Law” (Σπέρμα, ωάριο και γονιμοποιημένο ωάριο που 
βρίσκονται έξω από το ανθρώπινο σώμα: Η νομική τους φύση και μεταχείριση κατά το αστικό δίκαιο) 
by Kounougeri – Manoledaki, published in Armenopoulos Law Review, 53 (1999) 469 et seq., 475 et 
seq; ibidem: “Studies in Family Law and Biomedicine Law” (Μελέτες Οικογενειακού Δικαίου και 
Δικαίου της Βιοϊατρικής), 372 et seq., 381 et seq.; Vidalis, “Faceless Life2”  (Ζωή χωρίς πρόσωπο ) 
(2005), 45 et seq.; Symeonidou – Kastanidou, “Genetic Technology and Penal Law” (Γενετική 
τεχνολογία και ποινικό δίκαιο), essay published in the “Criminal Justice Digest” (Poiniki Dikaeosyni) 
10/2002, 1053 et seq.; Fountedaki, “Issues relevant to the disposal of reproductive material”, op.cit., 
157 et seq.; Papachristou, Family Law (Oikogeneiako Dikaeo) (2014) 224. 
12 Indicatively, see: Kounougeri – Manoledaki, “Sperm, Ovum and Fertilsed Ovum Outside the Human 
Body: Their Legal Nature and Treatment in Modern Greek Civil Law” (Σπέρμα, ωάριο και 
γονιμοποιημένο ωάριο που βρίσκονται έξω από το ανθρώπινο σώμα: Η νομική τους φύση και 
μεταχείριση κατά το αστικό δίκαιο), published in Studies, 372 et seq.; Fountedaki, Issues, op.cit. 159 et 
seq.; Papachristou, op. cit. 
13 The following facts are also to be considered, namely: (a) that disposing of one’s reproductive 
material without sexual intercourse does not in any way constitute adultery, i.e. a transgression of the 
duty of spousal faithfulness, consolidated under Article 1386 of the Greek Civil Code (see Kounougeri 
– Manoledaki, “In-vitro fertilization through third-party reproductive material: Bioethical and Civil 
Law Issues” in “Studies in Family Law and Biomedicine Law”, op. cit.) and (b) under the Greek Law, 
donors are in principle to remain anonymous, hence no risk implied for those married persons willing 




Recently promulgated Law 4272/2014 has resulted in a series of changes as to 
the issue of financial gain with respect to the reproductive material disposed. It has 
already been explained that a prohibition as to a financial gain being agreed for the 
disposal of reproductive material was instituted under Law 3089/2002, the reasoning 
of the legislator as to this particular aspect having been that whereas the reproductive 
material is legally a “thing” – in the sense that no human life has as yet been instilled 
in it (such life understood to commence upon completion of fourteen days from 
fertilisation and after the fertilised egg has been implanted in the uterus14), the natural 
purpose  of such material nevertheless is that of creating human life15. In the light of 
such assumption as to the purpose, allowing for the donor to be paid for the disposal 
of such material would have been immoral (in the sense of Articles 178 and 179 of the 
Greek Civil Code), the immorality actually having consisted in profiteering to the 
detriment of persons desperately trying to have children and therefore fulfill a very 
intense existential need16. 
On the other hand, Law 3305/2005 expressly stipulated that, whereas no 
payment may be tolerated in terms of remuneration to the donor, the latter might 
nevertheless plausibly expect to be reinstated as to expenses necessary for his/her 
reproductive material to be extracted and cryopreserved. Such is the case of medical, 
laboratorial as well as nursing expenses, travel and accommodation costs eventually 
incurred by the donor as well as any other loss suffered or gains prevented as a 
consequence of the donor abstaining from his/her occupational activities (Article 8.5). 
Adding to such legitimate compensation, Article 15.4 of Law 4272/2014 now 
provides for an entitlement to a redemption of medical expenses as well as for an 
indemnity as to the biological strain suffered by the donor, based on the reasoning 
that the extraction of gametes constitutes a light physical injury (at least when it 
                                                                                                                                            
to deposit their reproductive material, as to the eventuality of law suits or even blackmailing against 
them; moreover, in case of violation of the principle of anonymity, there applies Article 1479.2 of the 
Greek Civil Code, which, as already discussed, provides for a prohibition of judicial acknowledgement 
of paternity, as far as the donor is concerned (all such elements ultimately applying to the benefit of the 
spouse or the partner, the consent of which is not required). 
14 Indicatively, see: Kounougeri – Manoledaki, “Sperm, Ovum and Fertilised Ovum”, in Studies, 382 et 
seq. 
15 Indicatively, see: Kounougeri – Manoledaki, “Sperm, Ovum and fertilised Ovum”, in Studies, 372 et 
seq. 
16 See Kounougeri – Manoledaki, “In-vitro fertilization through third-party reproductive material”, in 
Studies, 433; by the same author: Assisted Reproduction through third-party donors, in “Law and 
Bioethics” (Dikaeo kai Vioethiki) – Nomiki Vivliothiki Editions, 2007 – 160, endnote 15. 




comes to eggs extracted from a woman by way of a surgical intervention)17. Already 
under Law 3305 (Article 8.5) the amount of indemnities was to be designated by the 
National Authority of Medically Assisted Reproduction. This particular feature, 
combined with the new provisions under Law 4272/2014, establishing an increase of 
indemnity amounts payable, is hopefully to have a positive effect in the sense of 
preventing abuses actually detected on both sides, namely: at times, egg donors are 
paid very low amounts whereas at times donors are indemnified by amounts high 
enough to essentially constitute a financial gain18. 
It is also worth mentioning that by virtue of that same Article, namely Article 
15.4. of Law 4272/2014, the terms  of Article 8.5. of Law 3305 were supplemented 
with a proviso stipulating that said indemnities are payable by the recipients to the 
doctors who, in turn disburse the respective amounts to the donors, so as to safeguard 
the principle of anonymity. 
Lastly, when it comes to the notion of financial gain, Law 4272/2014 brings 
about some considerable changes as to the sanctions entailed by an eventual violation 
of that particular prohibition. The most critical of such changes consists in the fact 
that whereas under Article 26.2. of Law 3305/2005 it had originally been stipulated 
that trading in reproductive material or brokering in such trading was punishable with 
imprisonment of up to 10 years, Article 20 of Law 4272/2014 eventually amended 
such sanction, providing for an imprisonment of no less than 2 years (in other words, 
what used to be accounted for as felony was now downgraded to a misdemeanor). An 
imprisonment of up to 10 years is provided solely in the case of the person liable for 
such act being found to be engaging in such activities professionally or habitually. 
Such shift in the law is laudable19, in view of the virulent criticism the previous 
system, having provided for much stricter sanctions, had come under, with certain 
penal law specialists20 having gone as far as to see in that previous treatment a 
                                                 
17 See, Milapidou. Law 4272/2014 on the “Transposition in the [Greek] Domestic Law of 
Implementing Directive 2012/25/EU of the Commission of the 9th of October 2012 laying down 
information procedures for the exchange, between Member States, of human organs intended for 
transplantation – Provisions relevant to Mental Health and Medically Assisted Reproduction ea’’ – 
Amendments brought to Law 3305/2005 (publication pending). 
18 See, Milapidou, op. cit. 
19 See, Milapidou, op. cit. 
20 See, Kaïafa – Gbandi, “The Penal provisions of Law 3305/2005: Symbolic Penal Law in the matter 
of biomedical abuses in human reproduction (Συμβολικό ποινικό δίκαιο για τις καταχρήσεις της 
βιοϊατρικής στην ανθρώπινη αναπαραγωγή) in «Publications of Medical Law and Bioethical Issues» 2 




violation of the principle of proportionality, especially in comparison with other 
sanctions of similar severity, reserved for crimes involving human beings (human 
trafficking or sex trade) rather that reproductive material which has hardly matured 
towards the creation of individual human life. 
I am coming now to the issue of donor anonymity, the last point I intend to 
raise, and that not because this issue has not been legislatively tackled in Greece, but 
because there have always been certain objections (as well as internationally) about it, 
and most particularly because of the fact that in certain countries, such objections 
have actually resulted in amendments to their legislations, in the form of abolition of 
the principle of anonymity, originally institutionalized. Thus, the provision of the 
possibility for a child to become informed of the very identity of the donor – as the 
case, for instance, is in Sweden, the United Kingdom, Austria and Switzerland – 
should be seen as an abolition of such principle and this although nowhere has it 
become accepted for a child to claim a right of establishment of kinship between the 
child and the donor the identity of whom becomes known under such circumstances. 
In the light of such considerations, it is therefore only natural for such debate to also 
develop in Greece, as to whether we should consider changing something in our laws, 
in the matter of the anonymity currently embedded. 
Let me once again remind, albeit summarily, certain things that have time and 
again been repeated in the past and indeed go down the list of the main arguments in 
favor and those against anonymity21. Those in favor of anonymity invoke the need for 
protection of family peace of both the parents and the child, the need to protect donors 
from the eventuality of legal proceedings against them (for example, lawsuits for a 
judicial acknowledgment of paternity), the interest in sustaining potential donors in 
their determination to make their reproductive material available, so that sufficient 
quantities of it are ensured, to the interest of all parties concerned as well as the need 
                                                                                                                                            
(Bio-technology issues – Cloning, 2006) 79 et seq. ; Milapidou, Law 3305/2005 “on the application of 
assisted reproduction methods”: Penal sanctions, (Ο Ν. 3305/2005 «Για την εφαρμογή των μεθόδων 
της υποβοηθούμενης αναπαραγωγής») in «Publications of Medical Law and Bioethics» 2 (2006), 93 et 
seq. 
21 Referent to all this argumentation, see indicatively: Kounougeri – Manoledaki, Family Law II5 83; 
Stampelou, in “Commented Civil Code” by Georgiadis / Stathopoulos VII2 (2007)  Article 1460, No. 3 
et seq.; Agallopoulou,, “Medically Assisted Human Reproduction and Third-Party Donor Anonymity” 
(Ιατρική υποβοήθηση στην ανθρώπινη αναπαραγωγή και ανωνυμία τρίτων δοτών γεννητικού υλικού), 
Honorary Edition for Prof. Mich. Stathopoulos I (2010) 4, et seq. 




to ensure that in case of disruption of relations between the parents, an eventual 
knowledge by them of the identity of the donor – up until then unknown to the child - 
shall not degenerate to become a means of blackmailing at the level of the parents, to 
the detriment of their relationship to the child. There remains, in effect, no doubt that 
the main – the most overwhelming – argument in favor of the donor’s anonymity is 
one of ideological, philosophical, theoretical and systematic nature. Seen in this light, 
anonymity is corroborated by the entire texture of the principle of “socio-emotional 
kinship” adopted by the Greek legislation, according to which principle – as already 
mentioned – the very circumstances of artificial reproduction result in the importance 
of biological truth and descent eventually subsiding, hence forcibly the subsidence of 
the importance of knowledge of the descent22. 
Let us now go into the argumentation in favor of donors becoming known23. 
Included in such arguments is the advocacy in favor of the potential to prevent incest 
(a risk that is associated to anonymity) and the possibility of prevention of hereditary 
health conditions. In that sense, a parallelism is attempted to the concept of adoption, 
under which there applies a right to knowledge of one’s true descent whereas there 
also prevails an argument of ideological – systematic nature, one that really governs 
the Greek legal system as a whole, namely the righteous claim of any human being to 
become informed of one’s roots. Such claim has in fact been embedded in the Greek 
Civil Code (Article 57, providing for the right to one’s personality), in the Greek 
Constitution (primarily under Article 5.1. on the freedom of development of one’s 
personality as well as under Articles 4.1 on gender equality and 21.1 on the childhood 
protection, also invoked in that sense) as well as in several international legal 
instruments as is, for instance, Article 7 of the International Declaration of the Rights 
of the Child (providing for the right of the child to know of its genitors as well as to 
be reared by them)24. 
                                                 
22 Kounougeri – Manoledaki, Family Law ΙΙ5 84, 87. 
23 Kounougeri – Manoledaki, Family Law ΙΙ5 84. 
24 The following scholars have proclaimed themselves in favor of anonymity: Kounougeri – 
Manoledaki, Family Law ΙΙ5 86, 87; Fountedaki, Informing the child born through heterologous 
artificial fertilization of its origins (Η πληροφόρηση του παιδιού που γεννήθηκε με ετερόλογη τεχνητή 
γονιμοποίηση για την καταγωγή του), ENOBE 48 (Artificial Fertilization and Genetics: an Ethical-
Legal Dimension) 2003, 136; Trokanas, Human Reproduction – Individual Autonomy and its Limits 
(Aναπαραγωγή – Η ιδιωτική αυτονομία και τα όριά της,) in “Publications on Medical Law and 
Bioethical Issues” – 13 (2011), 344 et seq.; Vrettos, in Commented Civil Code / Karakostas, Vol. 8a 
(2011), Article 1460, item 2; Papadopoulou – Klamari, In search of biological identity, article in the 




Obviously, each side is in a position to invoke arguments in favor of its own 
stance, considered in either case to be the one that caters to the child’s true interests 
best, all the more since it was the protection of the child that the legislator 
undoubtedly had in mind. 
Let us, therefore, go into the exact provisions under the Greek legislation 
relevant to the matter, so as to assess them and eventually discuss whether any 
amendments are in order. 
The Greek law establishes the rule of anonymity of the donors, since a donor’s 
identity is not disclosed to those aspiring at becoming parents, just as the identity of 
the child or its parents is not disclosed to third-party donors (Article 1460 of the 
Greek Civil Code, to which Article 1459.1.a of the Greek Civil Code is consonant). 
Also established in the Greek law, however, are (a) the possibility to have access to 
medical information about the donor, recorded in the Donors and Recipients National 
Registry of the National Authority of Medically Assisted Reproduction (Article 
1460.1.item (2) and Article 3 of the Greek Civil Code; Articles 8.6. and 20.2(c) of 
Law 3305/2005); (b) the maintenance, also by medically assisted reproduction 
centers, of a record of medical data of persons subjected to artificial reproduction and 
other relevant procedures (Article 16.6 of Law 3305); (c) the prohibition, in principle, 
of use of  the reproductive material of the same donor for more than ten times (Article 
9.2. of Law 3305) and (d) the obligation – as a derogation from the principle of 
anonymity – of maintenance, by the National Authority of Medically Assisted 
Reproduction of extremely confidential record files containing identity data of the 
donor, to be revealed solely upon authorization of such National Authority under 
special circumstances, namely when it is assessed that so is dictated by an 
overwhelming need, impossible to be catered to through ordinary medical 
information25. 
                                                                                                                                            
“Civil Law Applications” Law Review (ΕφΑΔ) 6 (2013) 707; Papachristou, Family Law, 222. 
Scholars in favor of the revelation of the donor’s identity include: Kotzabassi, Anonymity, 206; 
Agallopoulou, 19; Stampelou, In search of biological identity, de lege lata and de lege ferenda, article 
in the “Civil Law Applications” Law Review (ΕφΑΔ) 6 (2013), 712 et seq.; Panagopoulou – 
Koutnatzi, Right of acknowledgement of the donor of reproductive material (Δικαίωμα γνώσεως δότη 
γεννητικού υλικού) in “Medical Law and Bioethical Issues” (Ιατρικό Δίκαιο και Βιοηθική) 26 (2014) 1 
et seq. 
25 In the matter of data records relevant to human reproduction, the persons having access to such 
records as well as in the matter of the permission on the part of, amongst other, the National Authority 




A combination of such provisions eventually averts the risk of transmission of 
hereditary diseases on the part of the donor as well as the risk of incest whilst it is 
obvious that in the name of saving the child, the very identity of the donor may be 
revealed, without such revelation being, as already explained, allowed to establish a 
legal relationship with the donor by way of proceedings for the judicial 
acknowledgement of paternity (Article 1479.2 of the Greek Civil Code), a prohibition 
otherwise applying in the event of the donor being or becoming known as a 
consequence of violation of the law. Under the circumstances, the issue apparently 
still pending is and has always been the same, namely that of the child’s becoming 
informed, in view of the relevant legislative and supra-legislative provisions (by that 
essentially meaning the Constitution and the International Convention of the Rights of 
the Child) invoked by those opposing the principle of anonymity. 
Let me share with you my ideas as to this particular issue: to start with, my 
opinion remains that the donors’ anonymity – otherwise said, the fact of the donors’ 
identity remaining unknown – is the solution that best serves the child’s interest, in 
the light of the concept of socio-emotional kinship embedded under the Greek 
legislation. This kind of kinship may not be assimilated to the one established by way 
of adoption: in the latter case, the attitude of the biological parent towards the child is 
definitely different from that of the donor who has from the onset waived any 
biological kinship26. For this reason, I am of the opinion that besides being objectively 
of minimal if not any importance whatsoever to the child, knowledge of the donor’s 
identity might also result in the child’s harm, inducing the latter to some potentially 
pernicious psychological fixations and some vain quests of biological bonds all but 
typified by love or any, ever short-term, substantial relationship. Otherwise said, even 
under an ideological-pedagogical angle, the prevalent view in favor of the donor’s 
anonymity quite aptly and as purposefully educates on, orientates to and indeed 
familiarizes persons with the idea that under certain circumstances, love and care are 
what really counts, rather than biological descent. Moreover, in the light of 
possibilities created in the realm of artificial reproduction, the very concepts of 
                                                                                                                                            
of Medically Assisted Reproduction (Law 2472/1997), see Pantelidou, Personal Data and Medical 
Assistance in Human Reproduction (Προσωπικά δεδομένα και υποβοήθηση στην ανθρώπινη 
αναπαραγωγή), essay published in the “Nomiko Vima” Law Review, ΝοΒ 29 (2011) 57 et seq. 
26 See, Fountedaki, Informing …, op. cit., 138. 




“integration and protection of the personality” and “the need to know one’s genitors 
and to be reared by them”, embedded in the legislative texts invoked by advocates of 
the disclosure of the donors’ identities, should imperatively be given a different 
reading, an alternative interpretation, all the more when it comes to the heterologous 
assisted reproduction: why not consider as genitor the person who has actually desired 
for and given birth to the child, irrespective of whose reproductive material was 
actually involved? 
At this point, one further thing is also to be underscored: the law in Greece 
does not ultimately prohibit the child’s possibility of being informed by its parents 
that it was conceived by way of artificial reproduction as well as that such 
reproduction was performed with the use of third-party donor reproductive material27. 
That is to say, the child is legally entitled to take legal proceedings against its parents, 
by way of an action for performance28 requesting this particular type of information, 
on the basis (according to a more plausible opinion29), of Article 1507 of the Greek 
Civil Code, stipulating that genitors and offspring are obligated to mutual assistance, 
affection and respect. 
All it takes, therefore, for the child’s dignity to be preserved and its 
personality to be protected, is to refrain from inducing it to false perceptions as to the 
way whereby it came to this world. Allowing for the child to enter a process of 
essentially pointless quest of specific persons, would be vain and harmful for the 
child. Besides, the potential of such persistence in the quest of “roots” and “descent” – 
especially in the context of assisted reproduction – could just as well be 
misconstrued, so much as to be considered as concealing, albeit subconsciously, an 
ideology of commitment to the value of “descent”, the extensions of which are 
sometimes dangerous. 
                                                 
27 See, Fountedaki, op.cit. 137; also, Agallopoulou, op. cit. 19; Papadopoulou – Klamari, op. cit. 705 et 
seq. 
28 Although the judgement to be issued in response to such law suit may only be indirectly enforced, in 
the sense of Article 946 of the Greek Code of Civil Procedure (see Papadopoulou – Klamari, op. cit. 
707). See a relevant elaboration on the right of children born out of wedlock to initiate judicial 
proceedings against their mother by way of a condemnatory law suit, requesting to be informed of the 
identity of their biological father, in Koutsouradis, On the obligation of the mother towards her out-of-
the-wedlock offspring to inform the latter on its paternal ascendants, in Armenopoulos Law Review 
(Αρμ 33) (1979), 643 et seq.; Kounougeri – Manoledaki, Family Law ΙΙ5 183. Such elaboration is also 
valid with respect to children born through heterologous in vitro fertilization. 
29 See, Papadopoulou – Klamari, op. cit., 704 




In concluding, I believe that the rule of the donor’s anonymity, combined with 
all other relevant provisions in the Greek legislation, needs not to be anyhow 
amended. What is more, I consider the combination of all these provisions worth of 
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